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Since the revival of global capital 
markets in the 1960s, cross-border 
capital flows have increased by 
orders of magnitude, so much so that 
international asset positions now 
outstrip global economic output. Most cross-border capital flows occur among industrialized 
nations, but emerging markets are increasing participants in the globalization of capital flows. 
While it is widely recognized that investment is an important ingredient for economic growth, 
and that capital flows may under certain conditions be a valuable supplement to domestic 
savings for financing such investment, there is a growing concern that certain capital flows 
(such as short-term debt) can have de-stabilizing effects in developing countries. 
During the recent financial and currency crises a number of emerging market and developing 
countries experimented with a variety of measures that have traditionally been referred to as 
“capital controls”— defined as regulations on capital flows. Given that capital controls have 
been highly stigmatized, in this policy brief we will refer to them as capital account regulations 
(CARs). Those nations that deployed CARs in the years leading to the financial crisis were 
among the least hard hit when the global financial crisis wracked the world economy (Ostry et 
al. 2011).
The 2008 global financial crisis has opened a new chapter in the debate over the proper policy 
responses to pro-cyclical capital flows. Until very recently certain strands of the economics 
profession as well as industrialized country national governments and international financial 
institutions have remained either hostile or silent to regulating capital movements. Regardless, 
a number of emerging economies, including Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea, have been 
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successfully experimenting with CARs to manage volatile capital flows (Gallagher 2011; IMF 
2011b). The IMF has come to partially recognize the appropriateness of capital account 
regulations and has gone so far as to recommend (and officially approve) a set of guidelines 
regarding the appropriate use of CARs.
In September 2011, the Global Economic Governance Initiative at Boston University’s Pardee 
Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future — along with Columbia University’s Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue and Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute 
— convened a Task Force on Managing Capital Flows for Long-Run Development. Based 
on discussions among members, we argue that there is a clear rationale for capital account 
regulations in the post-crisis world, that the design and monitoring of such regulations is 
essential for their effectiveness, and that a limited amount of global and regional cooperation 
would be useful to ensure that CARs can form an effective part of the macroeconomic policy 
toolkit. This policy brief addresses these issues and provides a protocol for the use of CARs —
one that stands in stark contrast to a set of guidelines for the use of capital controls approved 
by the board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 2011 (see IMF 2011b).
capital Flows and the Two-speed recovery
A long line of prominent economists throughout history have argued that financial markets 
can be inherently unstable (see Ocampo, Spiegel, and Stiglitz 2008). Different authors use 
different terms but there is a consistent concern that during periods of growth, expectations 
can become extremely optimistic, leading to a reduction in risk aversion, a rapid expansion in 
credit, and a rise in asset prices. Imbalances associated with excessive risk taking build up, and 
if there are changes in expectations, possibly unleashed by facts that lead to a loss in asset 
values, the unwinding of positions may lead to instability, panics, and crises. Boom is then 
followed by bust.
Cross-border capital flows to emerging and developing countries tend to follow a similar 
pattern. Between 2002 and 2007 there were massive flows of capital into emerging markets 
and other developing economies. After the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was 
capital flight to the “safety” of the U.S. 
market, which spread the North Atlantic 
financial crisis to emerging markets. As 
interest rates were lowered for expansionary 
purposes in the industrialized world between 
2008 and 2011, capital flows again returned 
to emerging markets, where interest rates and 
growth were relatively higher. The carry trade 
was one of the key mechanisms that triggered 
these flows. Increased liquidity induced 
investors to go short on the dollar and long on currencies in nations with higher interest rates 
and expectations of strengthening exchange rates. With significant leverage factors, investors 
gained on both the interest rate differential and the exchange rate movements. 
These sudden surges in capital flows can be de-stabilizing for four reasons. First, if capital 
flows are large enough, such speculation can cause undue appreciation and volatility of 
exchange rates and lead to a boom in asset prices in developing economies.  Second, relatively 
small interest rate or currency changes can trigger an unwinding of (highly leveraged) 
positions which can cause a sudden stop of external financing and capital flight. Third, a 
sudden unwinding of positions where the investment entity is highly interconnected with 
“ Capital account regulations are often 
deployed to manage exchange rate volatility, 
avoid currency mismatches, limit speculative 
activity in an economy, and provide the policy-
space for independent monetary policy.” 
This paper stems from a recent 
meeting of the Pardee Center 
Task Force on Managing 
Capital Flows for Long-Run 
Development convened in 
collaboration with the Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue at Columbia 
University, and the Global 
Development and Environment 
Institute at Tufts University. For 
full list of Task Force members 
and other details, see www.
bu.edu/pardee/2011/09/16/
capital-flows-task-force/
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other parts of the financial system might cause systemic risk.  Fourth, 
in an environment where nations have open capital accounts, short-
term capital movements reduce the space for independent monetary 
policies. The dominant tool to stem inflation is the interest rate. However, 
raising interest rates would actually attract more capital flows, in effect 
generating expansionary pressures.  
Private capital flows to Asia and Latin America have returned to their 
pre-Lehman Brothers highs. This is the case in nations like Brazil, which 
saw an appreciation of its currency of over 40 percent between the 
third quarter of 2009 and 2011, and rising concern over asset bubbles 
and inflation. Indeed it will come as no surprise that it was Brazil’s 
finance minister who declared the surge in capital flows, the subsequent 
appreciations, and the myriad reactions to the surges as the beginning of 
a “currency war.” In the midst of these capital flows, individual nations 
have responded in various ways. In Brazil’s case, it has taken the form of 
a tax on foreign purchases of Brazilian securities and later with a reserve 
requirement and taxes for firms going short on the nation’s currency and 
holding some derivative positions in foreign currency. Box 1 outlines the 
various types of capital account regulations that have been deployed by 
nations in the run up to and during the crisis.
Capital account regulations are often deployed to manage exchange 
rate volatility, avoid currency mismatches, limit speculative activity in 
an economy, and provide the policy-space for independent monetary 
policy. Measures often come in two varieties, price or quantity-based. 
Price-based measures alter the price of foreign capital such as with a 
tax on inflows or outflows, and unremunerated reserve requirements 
(URRs) that have been deployed by such nations as Chile, Colombia, 
and Thailand. Quantity-based measures include prohibitions or caps on 
certain types of transactions (for example, on foreign borrowing below 
certain maturities, or for purposes other than investment or international 
trade), or minimum stay periods for capital that comes into the country.
rules of Thumb for deploying cArs
With respect to CARs, in February of 2010 the IMF published a staff 
position note which found that capital controls on the inflows of capital 
that were deployed over the past 15 years have been fairly effective. It 
also found that those nations that used capital controls were among 
the least hard hit during the world financial crisis (Ostry et al. 2010). 
A comprehensive review of the literature on this topic published by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research in the United States found, in 
turn, that capital regulation on inflows can make monetary policy more 
independent, alter the composition of capital flows towards longer-term 
flows and reduce real exchange rate pressures, and that regulations on 
outflows can be effective as well (Magud et al. 2011). 
The IMF now recognizes that CARs should be part of the policy toolkit for financial stability. 
Moreover, the IMF also recognizes that the very use of the term “capital controls” can bring a 
stigma to some nations that may impact the way investors perceive the investment climate in 
a nation. Indeed, in the 1990s credit rating agencies would downgrade the credit of nations 
inflows
•   Unremunerated reserve requirements (a 
proportion of new inflows are kept as 
reserve requirements in the central bank)
•   Taxes on new debt inflows, or on foreign 
exchange derivatives
•   Limits or taxes on net liability position in 
foreign currency of financial intermediaries
•   Restrictions on currency mismatches
•   End use limitations: Borrowing abroad only 
allowed for investment and foreign trade
•   Limits on domestic agents that can borrow 
abroad (e.g., only firms with net revenues in 
foreign currency)
•   Mandatory approvals for all or some 
capital transactions
•   Minimum stay requirements
Outflows
•   Mandatory approval for domestic agents 
to invest abroad or hold bank accounts in 
foreign currency
•   Mandatory requirement for domestic 
agents to report on foreign investments 
and transactions done with their foreign 
account
•   Prohibition or limits on sectors in which 
foreigners can invest
•   Limits or approval on how much non-
residents can invest (e.g., on portfolio 
investments)
•   Restrictions on amounts of principal or 
capital income that foreign investors can 
send abroad 
•   Limits on how much non-residents can 
borrow in the domestic market
•   Taxes on capital outflows
Box 1: An illustrative List of  
capital Account regulations 
that deployed controls (Abdelal 2007). Therefore, the IMF proposed a new nomenclature for 
capital controls, suggesting they be referred to as capital flow management measures (CFMs). 
Others have previously suggested the term “capital management techniques” to the same end 
(see Epstein et al. 2003; Ocampo et al. 2008). As we have indicated, we prefer to use the term 
“capital account regulations,” to underscore the fact they belong to the broader family of 
financial regulations. 
The IMF formulated and approved at the board level a set of guidelines pertaining to when 
a nation should and should not deploy CARs. In a nutshell, the official report recommends 
that CARs be used as a last resort and as a temporary measure, and only after a nation has 
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•   Capital Account Regulations (CARs) 
should be seen as an essential part 
of the macroeconomic policy  
toolkit and not seen as measures  
of last resort.
•   CARs should be considered 
differently in nations where the 
capital account is still largely 
closed versus those nations where 
CARs are prudential regulations to 
manage an open capital account.
•   Price-based CARs have the 
advantage of being more market 
neutral, but quantity-based CARs 
may be more effective, especially in 
nations with relatively closed capital 
accounts, weaker central banks, or 
when incentives to bring in capital 
are very large.
•   CARs should not only be relegated 
to regulations on capital inflows. 
Capital outflow restrictions may 
be among the most significant 
deterrents of undesirable inflows 
and can serve other uses as well.
•   CARs can be seen as alternatives 
to foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation, particularly to reduce 
the costs of reserve accumulation.
•   CARs should not be seen as 
solely temporary measures, 
but should be thought of as 
permanent mechanisms to be 
used in a counter-cyclical way 
to smooth booms and busts. 
Their permanence will strengthen 
institutional capacity to implement 
them effectively.
•   Investors can increasingly 
circumvent CARs through mis-
invoicing trade flows, derivative 
operations, or foreign direct 
investments that are in fact  
debt flows.
•   Therefore, CARs should be seen 
as dynamic, requiring a significant 
degree of market monitoring and 
‘fine tuning’ as investors adapt and 
circumvent regulation.
•   It may be useful for effective CARs 
to distinguish between residents 
and non-residents.
•   The full burden of managing capital 
flows should not be on emerging 
market and developing countries, 
but the ‘source’ countries of capital 
flows should also play a role in 
capital flow management, including 
supporting the effectiveness of 
those regulations put in place by 
recipient countries.
•   Neither industrialized nations nor 
international institutions should 
limit the ability of nations to deploy 
CARs whether through trade and 
investment treaties or through loan 
conditionality.
•   Industrialized nations should 
examine more fully the global 
spillover effects of their own 
monetary policies and evaluate 
measures to reduce excessive 
outflows of short-term capital that 
can be undesirable both for them 
and emerging countries.  
•   The stigma attached to CARs 
should be removed, so nations have 
ample confidence that they will not 
be rebuked for taking action. The 
IMF could play a valuable role in 
taking away the stigma of CARs, as 
well as doing comparative analysis 
of which CARs are most effective.
BOX 2:  Guidelines for the use of capital Account regulations in developing countries
Source: Pardee Task Force on Managing Capital Flows for Long-Run Development
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accumulated sufficient reserves, adjusted interest rates, and let its currency appreciate, among 
other measures. When capital account regulations are used, the IMF suggests that controls  
be price-based and that they not discriminate against the residence of the investor that makes 
the flow.
Though the IMF should be applauded for recognizing that CARs are useful, its prescriptions 
fall short of being sound advice for developing countries on a number of fronts. Without 
the advice of the IMF many nations have deployed CARs, alongside a host of other 
macroeconomic and macro-prudential policies as they have seen appropriate. And, according 
to the IMF’s own research, CARs have been a success even though they have sometimes not 
met those guidelines. We outline an alternative set of guidelines in Box 2. In no way do we 
think these should be binding protocols at the global level. Rather, we hope than can serve as 
useful rules of thumb for national policy-makers.
First and foremost, CARs should be seen as an essential part of 
the macroeconomic policy toolkit and not as mere measures of 
last resort. In the econometric work that recognizes the utility 
of CARs, such regulations were part of a battery of approaches 
taken in tandem to manage the capital account. CARs should thus 
be seen as part of the arsenal that needs to be used to prevent 
and mitigate crises. In turn, they should not be seen as solely 
temporary measures, but rather as permanent tools that can be 
used in a counter-cyclical way to smooth booms and busts. 
Secondly, CARs should be considered differently in nations where capital accounts remain 
largely closed — and in which they may be used as part of a strategy to gradually open the 
capital account — versus those nations where CARs are prudential regulations to manage an 
already open capital account. The IMF report acts as if the set of nations it was talking to 
were nations with open capital accounts and floating exchange rates, but many developing 
countries deploy capital account regulations as a regular macro-prudential management 
technique and intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets.
Third, quantity-based CARs may be more effective than price-based CARs, especially in those 
nations with relatively closed capital accounts, weaker central banks or when incentives to 
bring in capital are very large (large interest rate differentials or strong expectations of exchange 
rate appreciation). This is consistent with economic theory and some IMF staff work. Because 
of uncertainties and asymmetric information about the private sector’s response, price-based 
measures may be difficult to calibrate correctly and therefore a quantity-based measure may be 
more appropriate. Indeed, IMF research has shown that quantity-based CARs have proven to 
be more effective under several conditions (Ariyoshi et al. 2000).
In addition, while there has been a sea change in thinking regarding CARs on capital inflows, 
regulations on capital outflows have largely been shunned. CARs should not only be relegated 
to regulations on capital inflows. Capital outflow restrictions may be among the most 
significant deterrents of undesirable inflows and can serve other uses as well. Moreover, 
in times of acute crisis capital controls on outflows may be necessary to help stop the 
precipitous slide of a currency and a run on banks.  Indeed, the IMF sanctioned controls on 
outflows in Iceland as part of its rescue package with that nation during the financial crisis. 
Finally, some members of our task force argued that regulating outflows can help channel 
credit and investment into the “real economy”.
CARs should also be seen as alternatives to foreign exchange reserve accumulation. Recent 
work has shown that the social costs of foreign reserve accumulation in developing countries 
“ Capital outflow restrictions may 
be among the most significant 
deterrents of undesirable inflows 
and can serve other uses as well.”
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can reach two to three percent of GDP (Aizenman 2009; Rodrik 2006). CARs are an 
instrument to reduce excessive reserve accumulation.
The need for Monitoring and Fine Tuning
The IMF guidelines give scant attention to the policy design issues related to CARs. Though 
IMF econometric work shows that CARs have been effective, there is to date a lack of research 
regarding how nations administratively have designed and fine-tuned such regulations to make 
them successful. Much of the literature shows that, without the proper fine-tuning, capital 
regulations may lose their effectiveness due to the ability of foreign investors to evade and 
circumvent such regulations. This can be done by ‘misinvoicing’ trade flows, disguising debt 
flows as foreign direct investment, and by using derivatives.
Nations such as Brazil and South Korea have increasingly “fine-tuned” their 
regulations with an attempt to keep up with the various levels of circumvention. 
Fine- tuning of CARs is essential for their effectiveness — and may be far simpler 
than some may argue, especially if they target the large actors. When regulations 
are price-based and administered by the tax system, violators could see criminal 
penalty — creating a strong incentive to comply. Box 3 illustrates examples of the 
use of CARs in the wake of the crisis and shows how Brazil and Korea have been 
constantly strengthening and changing the composition of their capital account 
regulations in response to new market conditions.
The need for international cooperation
Rather than a globally enforceable code of conduct that could lead to the 
requirement to open capital accounts across the globe, the IMF, G-20, the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and other  bodies should make a stronger effort to reduce 
the stigma attached to CARs and protect the ability of nations to deploy CARs to 
prevent and mitigate crises. Moreover, these bodies can be part of a global dialogue 
about the extent to which nation states should coordinate CARs.  
In the original design of the IMF, it was charged with both permitting and helping 
to enforce CARs. Both John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White saw them 
as a core component of the Bretton Woods system. In those deliberations Keynes said that, 
“control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature 
of the post-war system.” Indeed, the IMF was not given jurisdiction over liberalization of the 
capital account at all under its articles of agreement. Article VI of those articles goes further 
to say that members may “exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international 
capital movements” (see Helleiner 1994).  
The IMF, G-20, the FSB, and their respective members could clarify the new thinking on CARs 
in communiques, speeches and other venues such as in official reports such as the World 
Economic Outlook. Such continued attention to CARs would help continue to remove the 
stigma associated with their use. Not only would it calm both national governments and 
market participants, it may also trickle into the legal discourse and help broaden the way the 
global community legally interprets macro-prudential regulations.  
This is important because the policy space provided for under the IMF articles of agreement 
is being eroded by trade and investment agreements. Increasingly, these agreements prohibit 
the use of CARs and those treaties that have exceptions for measures to manage balance of 
payments crises only allow CARs to be temporary in nature. In Asia, where CARs on both 
www.bu.edu/pardee
Brazil 
DatE MEasurE
19-Oct-09 Inflows tax (2 percent) 
18-Nov-09 ADR tax (1.5 percent)
3-Oct-10 Inflows tax (4 percent)
17-Oct-10 Inflows tax (6 percent)
5-Jan-11 Reserve requirement
26-Jul-11 Tax on derivatives
South Korea
DatE MEasurE
30-Jun-10 Currency controls
30-Jun-10 End use limitations
18-Dec-10 Outflows tax
Box 3: capital Account  
regulations and the crisis
Source: Gallagher 2011
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inflows and outflows are the most prevalent, ASEAN will require nations to eliminate most 
CARs by 2015, with relatively narrow exceptions. Trade and investment agreements with the 
United States provide the least flexibility. In January of 2011, some 250 economists from 
across the globe called on the United States to recognize the recent consensus on CARs and 
to permit nations the flexibility to deploy controls to prevent and mitigate crises. The letter 
was rebuked by prominent business associations and the U.S. government. In response to the 
letter, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner replied that U.S. policy would go unchanged. 
Secretary Geithner wrote:
“In general, we believe that those risks are best managed through a mix of fiscal and monetary policy 
measures, exchange rate adjustment, and carefully designed non-discriminatory prudential measures, such as 
bank reserve or capital requirements and limitations on exposure to exchange rate risk.”
This is ironic given that the U.S. approved the guidelines for CARs at the IMF. 
Finally, the global community should start a conversation regarding the extent to which there 
should be coordination among national governments regarding CARs — especially between 
inflow and outflow nations. In the meetings leading up to the establishment of the IMF both 
Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes agreed that capital controls be targeted at 
“both ends” of a capital flow (Helleiner 1994). Furthermore, the industrialized nations are 
more often the source of such flows but generally ignore the negative spillover effects of their 
actions. The expansionary monetary policy by the U.S. — which is quite justified in order to 
generate employment and recovery in that country — leads to the harmful carry trade effects 
discussed earlier. However, despite this fact, thus far the entire burden of managing capital 
flows has fallen on those countries that are the recipients of those inflows.
There may be an alignment of interests to coordinate on capital flows.  Industrialized nations 
are aiming to recover from the crisis and hope that credit and capital stays in their nations. 
Meanwhile the developing world has little interest in having to receive those flows. There is 
therefore some alignment of interests that could form the means for industrialized nations to 
adjust their tax codes and deploy other types of regulation to keep capital in their countries, 
as emerging markets deploy CARs to change the composition and reduce the level of those 
capital flows that may destabilize their economies. •
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